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Abstract
This study tests the impact of a public prescription benefit on Medicare-eligible veterans,
utilizing a mid-1990s benefit change in the VA health care system. Using data from the Medicare
Current Beneficiary Survey, I compare prescription spending and utilization, as well as use of
other health services and health outcomes for veterans and non-veterans before and after the VA
insurance change. Results show that receipt of a publicly-provided prescription benefit leads to
an increase in spending on prescriptions, and simultaneously, a decrease in spending on other
medical services. On average, every $1 increase in drug spending is associated with a $6.50
decrease in other medical spending, and this change is accompanied by measured improvements
in the health of benefit recipients. The benefit appears to accrue mainly to low-income and
disabled individuals who typically have higher-than-average medical expenses, and are also more
likely to experience substantial welfare gains from the relative income increase associated with
the reduction (to zero) in the price of prescription drugs.
JEL Classification Codes: I1, H51
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my own.I.  Introduction 
  Since the 1965 inception of the Medicare program, the utilization and importance 
of prescription drug therapies has increased dramatically.  When Medicare was first 
established, the role of pharmaceuticals in medicine was still fairly limited.  Because drug 
spending made up only a small share of total medical expenditures in the U.S., outpatient 
prescription drug coverage was not a standard feature of most insurance programs, 
including Medicare.  As drugs became an increasingly critical component of modern 
health care, the vast majority of private insurance plans incorporated prescription drug 
coverage into their standard benefits packages.  The very recent addition of such 
coverage to Medicare has therefore been a topic of extreme importance.   
The discussion of prescription drug coverage for the elderly is of particular 
significance because these individuals spend more on drugs than any other segment of the 
U.S. population.  While 13 percent of the U.S. population is Medicare-eligible, Medicare 
beneficiaries account for 36 percent of prescription drug expenditures in this country 
(Goldman et al., 2002).  According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, 
drug spending for this population will rise at an average rate of 10 percent per year over 
the next ten years – far outstripping the anticipated growth in the U.S. economy (CBO, 
Oct. 2002).  The enactment of the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and 
Modernization Act of 2003 only partly addresses the concerns over the lack of 
prescription drug coverage for the elderly in the United States.  Under this legislation, the 
Medicare program introduced a drug benefit (first available in January 2006) providing 
partial coverage of prescriptions.  This coverage is designed to protect Medicare-eligibles 
  1with catastrophically high prescription expenditures, but still requires fairly high out-of-
pocket payments for many beneficiaries.
1
  The expected impact of Medicare prescription drug eligibility on spending, drug 
utilization and health outcomes is not theoretically obvious and is important to establish 
empirically.  Proponents of the Medicare drug benefit commonly suggest that this 
coverage, although expensive initially, will be cost-saving in the long run.  It has been 
argued that the availability of affordable drugs and/or access to more expensive but more 
effective prescriptions may improve the health of the elderly such that their use of other, 
more expensive Medicare services will decline.
2  It is also worth noting that regardless of 
the impact on spending, a prescription benefit may lead to overall welfare increases both 
from health improvements, and if money that elderly individuals previously spent on 
prescriptions may now be used for other basic necessities (e.g. food, shelter, heat, 
clothing). 
On the other hand, detractors maintain that the long-run costs will outweigh the 
benefits.  This is a distinct possibility, depending on the direction and magnitude of the 
impact on utilization of other health services.  Goldman and Philipson (2007) 
demonstrate that the impact of a drug benefit on utilization of other medical services is 
theoretically ambiguous (i.e. depending on the cross price elasticity of drugs and other 
types of medical care, use of non-prescription services may actually increase).  Yang, 
                                                 
1 For most individuals, these costs include a $250 annual deductible, a 25% coinsurance rate on the first 
$2250 of drug spending, no coverage for spending between $2250 and $5100, and a 5% coinsurance rate 
for all drug expenditures above $5100. 
2 Evidence from the medical literature lends some support to this claim.  Soumerai et al. (1991) find that 
introducing a cap on the number of monthly prescriptions available to elderly Medicaid-eligibles in New 
Hampshire increased the risk of entering a nursing home over the course of one year.  Soumerai et al. 
(1994) find that the same prescription cap resulted in an almost immediate increase in emergency mental 
health care and hospitalizations among mental health patients, leading to spending increases that exceeded 
the savings in prescription costs.  Tamblyn et al. (2001) find that greater prescription cost-sharing in 
Canada led to higher rates of related adverse health events and emergency room visits for the elderly. 
  2Gilleskie and Norton (2004) additionally point out that health improvements resulting 
from better access to drug therapies may lead to increased life expectancy, and therefore 
increased lifetime consumption of medical care.  Ultimately, empirical evidence is 
required to determine the overall spending, utilization, and welfare effects of a 
prescription benefit. 
This paper examines the impact of a drug benefit on elderly Medicare 
beneficiaries by utilizing an exogenous change in eligibility for prescription drug 
coverage for a subset of the Medicare population.  During the mid-1990s, the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) revamped its health care system, expanding both 
the population covered and the menu of available services.  As part of this overhaul, VA 
established its first clearly defined health benefits package.  This package was made 
available to all U.S. veterans, and includes a prescription drug benefit.  This unique setup 
allows for estimation of the impact of drug coverage on Medicare-eligible veterans, 
utilizing a difference-in-differences strategy with non-veteran Medicare-eligibles as the 
control group. 
Utilizing the VA policy change, this study tests the impact of the introduction of 
prescription coverage on drug utilization and spending, spending on and utilization of 
other health care services, and self-reported health.  Results indicate that the introduction 
of a prescription benefit leads to higher spending on drugs, but that spending on other 
medical services falls by $6.50 for every $1 increase in drug spending.  This lends strong 
credence to the claim that a prescription benefit has the potential to be cost-saving over 
time, although this study cannot test the impact of the benefit on life expectancy or 
lifetime medical expenditures.   
  3 
II.  Background 
A.  Prescription Drugs and the Elderly 
  Prescription drug spending in the United States has increased rapidly in recent 
years.  These increases in spending can be attributed to a number of factors, including the 
introduction of new and increasingly more effective drugs with fewer side effects, and the 
higher cost of new brand-name drugs relative to older, generic alternatives.  Older 
Americans have had particularly large increases in demand for these costly drug therapies 
because they tend to be in poorer health, with higher rates of disability and chronic illness 
than their younger counterparts (Yang et al., 2004).  The distribution of prescription drug 
spending by the Medicare population is skewed, with the majority of beneficiaries 
spending under $2000 per year (CBO, 2002).  A large proportion of drug spending by 
Medicare-eligibles is concentrated in a relatively small share of the population – mainly 
individuals with chronic conditions.  CBO predicted that only 17 percent of the Medicare 
population would spend more than $5000 on drugs in 2005, but that their spending would 
comprise more than 54 percent of total drug costs for the group (CBO, 2002). 
  Prior to the availability of prescription drug coverage through traditional 
Medicare, many elderly individuals received coverage from other sources including 
retiree health plans, individually purchased supplemental insurance, and Medicare 
HMOs.  Even so, the generosity of these supplemental insurance plans was variable, and 
on average, 40 percent of drug expenditures for these individuals were out-of-pocket 
(CBO, 2002).  Additionally, the likelihood that individuals had access to outside 
coverage varied by income level.  Low-income elderly were often eligible for drug 
  4coverage through Medicaid, while individuals with higher incomes were the most likely 
to have retiree health benefits.
3  Medicare beneficiaries with incomes between these two 
groups (in particular, those with incomes between one and three times the poverty level) 
were the most likely to have no outside prescription drug coverage (CBO, 2002). 
  Most studies examining the impact of prescription drug coverage on drug 
utilization by Medicare-eligibles rely on cross-sectional comparisons of beneficiaries 
without any drug coverage to those with prescription drug coverage from an outside 
source.
4  These papers find, overall, that the presence of prescription insurance is 
associated with increased drug utilization.  While these correlations are of interest, they 
do not provide direct evidence for the impact of a universal prescription benefit on drug 
utilization for the elderly.  Because these studies cannot control for the endogenous 
selection of individuals into such supplemental insurance plans, they do not adequately 
simulate the introduction of a benefit for the entire Medicare population. 
  Khan et al (2007) utilize longitudinal data and a model with person-specific fixed 
effects to examine the impact of changes in individuals’ drug coverage over time.  They 
find an increase in prescription drug utilization ranging from 6% to 14% as a result of 
gaining prescription coverage, and find no significant effects on the health or 
hospitalization rates of users.  While their strategy is an improvement over the cross-
sectional studies, they are still unable to control for unobservable causes of selection into 
various plans or time variation in the other (non-drug) components of an individual’s 
insurance coverage.   
                                                 
3 Because of increases in drug costs and spending, retiree health plans have also begun scaling back their 
generosity. 
4 For example, Lillard et al. (1999), Poisal et al. (1999), Blustein (2000), Federman et al. (2001), Poisal and 
Murray (2001).  
  5Shang and Goldman (2007) focus specifically on Medigap enrollees, comparing 
those with and without drug coverage and controlling for selection into plans.  They find 
that availability of drug coverage leads to an increase in prescription spending and a drop 
in both Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B spending.
5  This study provides important 
evidence regarding the impact of prescription consumption on other types of medical 
spending.  It does not, however, simulate a publicly available prescription benefit since 
individuals must purchase supplemental Medigap insurance.  The introduction of the VA 
benefit is much more similar to the exogenous change in Medicare drug coverage, in that 
it provides newly-introduced and publicly available prescription coverage at little or no 
cost to the veteran.
6
 
B.  The VA Reforms and Medicare-Eligible Veterans 
  This study utilizes a major expansion in both the services provided and population 
served by the VA health care system.  In 1996, in an effort to catch up with progress in 
private-sector medicine, the VA health care system began to shift from an emphasis on 
hospital-based specialty services to a focus on primary care and preventive medicine.  
Simultaneously, as a result of expected efficiency gains from the new model, VA 
changed its rules on eligibility for care.  Prior to the reform, VA guaranteed care only to 
veterans with service-connected conditions or low incomes (hereafter referred to as 
“previously-eligibles”); following the restructuring, all veterans became eligible for VA 
health care (GAO/T-HEHS-99-109).  As a result of the changes in the system, VA’s 
                                                 
5 Medicare Part A covers inpatient services, while Medicare Part B covers outpatient services. 
6 As described in the next section, the benefit is free to many veterans, but non-disabled veterans with high 
incomes pay a small co-payment to fill a prescription.  Even for these individuals, the amount of cost-
sharing associated with the drug benefit is substantially smaller than that required by Medicare Part D.  
  6patient load increased from 2.6 million veterans in 1995 to 4.3 million in 2002 (GAO/T-
HEHS-96-134, GAO-03-1103R). 
  The Medicare-eligible portion of the veteran population has been particularly 
interested in taking up VA care as a result of this policy change.  As part of the VA 
reforms, the government created the Medical Benefits Package, the first health benefits 
plan for veterans.  This plan covers a number of services including primary care and 
preventive services, and, most notably, prescription drugs.
7  The drug benefit resulted in 
very high and increasing take-up rates among veterans over the age of 65.  In 2002, 26 
percent of the veteran population was Medicare-eligible, but 50 percent of VA-users were 
Medicare-eligible.  Among newly-eligible users, the proportion over age 65 grew from 52 
percent in 1999 to 65 percent in 2001.  Over the same period, the number of 30-day 
prescription equivalents provided to newly-eligible veterans increased from 11 million to 
26 million.  The rate of growth of VA pharmacy expenditures for newly-eligible veterans 
between 1999 and 2001 was more than four times that for all other treated veterans 
(GAO-03-161).   
  While the VA drug benefit was particularly important to newly-eligible veterans, 
the overhaul in the system and expansion in services attracted many previously-eligibles 
as well.  Although spending on prescription drugs increased at a faster rate for the newly-
eligible segment of the treated population, the net increase in spending for veterans in the 
newly-eligible group accounted for only 28 percent of the total increase in drug spending 
between 1999 and 2001 (GAO-03-161).  VA health care may have been particularly 
                                                 
7 For newly-eligible (non-poor and non-disabled) veterans, VA charges modest co-payments for use of 
services ($2 per 30-day supply of each prescription drug during the study period), while all previously-
eligible (poor and/or service-connected disabled) veterans may use VA services free of charge.  If a veteran 
has private insurance, VA is also authorized to bill the insurance company for any services rendered that 
are not related to a service-connected condition, but VA cannot seek reimbursement from Medicare. 
  7attractive to low-income veterans following the policy change.  These previously-
eligibles were less likely than their disabled counterparts to have been aware of their 
eligibility for VA care prior to the reforms.  Because the reforms were well-publicized 
and laid out much clearer eligibility rules, they may have affected some previously-
eligible veterans in similar ways to the newly-eligible population.   
 
III. Data and Empirical Strategy 
  In order to estimate the impact of a prescription drug benefit on Medicare-eligible 
veterans, I utilize data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) for the 
years 1992-2001.  The MCBS is a rotating panel of Medicare beneficiaries, with an over-
sampling of older individuals.  These data combine a survey component with Medicare 
claims records, resulting in a dataset containing demographics for each survey 
participant, as well as detailed information about the individual’s health status, utilization 
of medical care and medical spending.  Health status information includes a self-reported 
health measure as well as various activities of daily living assessments.  Utilization 
variables include, among other things, information on doctor visits, hospital admissions, 
and the number of one-month prescription equivalents filled in the survey year.  Spending 
information is broken down by type of medical service (for example, prescription drugs) 
and also by payer (for example, VA). 
  I employ a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to compare prescription 
drug utilization and payments for veterans and non-veterans before and after the policy 
change.  Because of the very small number of female Medicare-eligible veterans, I 
restrict my sample to males.  Additionally, because of the significant differences between 
  8the elderly and younger individuals receiving Medicare because of disability, I limit my 
sample to individuals age 65 and over.  Finally, I drop Medicare HMO enrollees from the 
sample, because many of these individuals already received publicly-provided drug 
coverage in the pre-period.  Additionally, changes in Medicare HMO market penetration 
and benefits in the late post-period
8 impact veterans and non-veterans differentially, 
potentially clouding the results. 
Since changes in the VA system were implemented throughout 1996 and 1997, I 
define 1992-1995 as the pre-period and 1998-2001 as the post-period.  I estimate the 
following equation by OLS: 
(1) yit = β0 + β1veterani + β2postt*veterani+β3Xit +δt + μit. 
The dependent variable, yit, includes measures of prescription drug utilization and 
spending, measures of health, hospital stays and doctor visits, and spending on non-
prescription inpatient and outpatient services.  Independent variables include veterani, an 
indicator equal to one if the individual has been honorably discharged from active 
military duty, and postt, an indicator equal to one in the post-policy period.  Xit is a vector 
of individual characteristics:  age, race, marital status, education, income, urban-rural and 
state dummies, and age*veteran dummies.  The model also includes year dummies (δt) 
and a random error term (μit). 
Although respondents may remain in the sample for as long as five years, with the 
omission of 1996 and 1997 a very small number of pre-period respondents remain in the 
data for the post-period.  For this reason, individual fixed effects are not included in the 
model and the dataset is treated as though it consists of repeated cross sections.   
                                                 
8 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 reduced reimbursements to Medicare HMO participants, causing many 
plans to either reduce their benefits or withdraw from the market entirely, beginning in 1999. 
  9  Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.  In comparing the two populations, 
there is a notable difference in average age patterns across the groups.  While the non-
veteran sample is slightly older on average, the age of the average non-veteran decreases 
slightly over time while the age of the average veteran increases.  These age differences 
are likely to explain at least some of the other average demographic differences between 
the two samples.  In order to control for this factor, I allow age to enter into my 




  As mentioned above, theory predicts that the introduction of a prescription benefit 
will lead to increases in total spending on prescriptions and in prescription utilization, 
although the magnitude of the response depends on the price elasticity of demand for 
drugs.  Since the VA reform results in an exogenous positive change in drug coverage for 
a large number of veterans, the expectation is that Medicare-eligible veterans will 
respond by increasing their consumption of prescription drugs.  Table 2 reports results for 
prescription spending and utilization from OLS difference-in-differences regressions.
9  
The outcomes considered are total (annual) spending on prescription drugs (where total 
spending is measured in 2000 dollars as the sum of spending for each individual by all 
payers in a given year), the logged number of prescriptions filled during the year, and an 
indicator variable for any drug spending that year.  As expected, total spending on 
prescription drugs for the average Medicare-eligible veteran increases as a result of the 
                                                 
9 Probits have also been tested for 0-1 outcome variables and produce qualitatively similar results. See 
Table 5. 
  10introduction of a drug benefit.  On average, total spending increases by $97 as a result of 
the policy change, an 18 percent increase relative to the average the pre-period veteran 
average. 
  Surprisingly, this substantial increase does not appear to be accompanied by a 
marked change in the number of prescriptions filled.  Although the coefficient on the 
logged number of prescriptions is positive, it is relatively small and insignificant.  At the 
same time, there does appear to be a positive change (significant at 10%) in the 
proportion of individuals with any spending on prescription drugs, but this coefficient is 
small, indicating a 2 percent increase in the probability that an individual fills any 
prescriptions during the year.  The insignificant change in the average number of 
prescriptions filled as a result of gaining insurance coverage implies highly inelastic 
prescription drug demand.
10  Rather than a change in total number of prescriptions filled, 
the increase in spending potentially represents the ability to switch to newer, more 
expensive drugs.
11  If these drugs are more effective or have fewer side effects, this 
switch may have significant benefits.  Additionally, there may be substantial positive 
health and welfare effects for the few individuals who previously could not fill any 
prescriptions and now have positive drug spending.   
  As has been noted by researchers and policy-makers alike, a prescription drug 
benefit for Medicare-eligibles has the potential to impact not only prescription drug 
                                                 
10 This finding is consistent with Pauly and Zheng (2004) which concludes that expenditures on outpatient 
prescription drugs are more persistent for individuals across years than other categories of medical 
spending. 
11 Studies comparing the VA formulary to other formularies (e.g. GAO-01-183 and Institute of Medicine 
2000) support this possibility, concluding that while improvements can be made to the system, veterans are 
generally receiving the drugs preferred by their physicians.  A 2000 investigation by the Institute of 
Medicine concluded that the VA formulary is “in some respects [more], but in many respects less, 
restrictive than other public or private formularies.”  That report also states that the VA formulary 
compares favorably to private-sector and Medicaid formularies.   
  11spending and utilization, but the consumption of other medical services as well.  As 
discussed previously, it is not obvious ex-ante whether such a benefit substitutes for 
utilization of other services by preventing more serious illness, or whether drugs and 
other medical services are complements.  It is possible that the drug benefit may induce 
individuals to increase the frequency of their doctor visits for the purpose of obtaining 
prescriptions, and medical providers may then notice and treat conditions that would 
otherwise have been ignored.  Regardless of whether prescription drugs and other 
medical services are substitutes or complements, the availability of drug therapies has the 
potential to impact health outcomes.   
For these reasons, I consider the effects of the VA policy change on non-
prescription health care utilization and on health outcomes.  Results are reported in Table 
3.  Because the VA policy change had many components, I am unable to specifically 
isolate the impact of the drug benefit on the outcomes reported in this table.  Instead, this 
table shows the impact of the policy change as a whole on the health and health care 
utilization of Medicare-eligible veterans.  Even so, there is a great deal of evidence that 
the prescription drug benefit accounted for a significant portion of the increase in VA’s 
Medicare-eligible patient load.  The VA Office of Inspector General estimated that as 
many as 90 percent of newly-eligible users of VA care were primarily interested in using 
the system to fill prescriptions (Office of Inspector General, 2000).  Thus, while the 
effects reported in Table 3 are not a result of drug coverage alone, they are suggestive of 
the potential impact of such a benefit. 
  As shown in the table, the average number of hospital stays falls by .045 as a 
result of the policy change, a 15 percent decrease relative to the pre-period.  The 
  12coefficient on the number of office visits is positive, but substantially smaller (relative to 
the pre-period mean) and insignificant.  These effects are, at least in part, a mechanical 
result of the shift in the nature of care provided by VA.  Since VA shifted from an 
inpatient to an outpatient emphasis, many services that were previously provided in an 
inpatient setting were shifted to clinics.  However, when examining veterans of all ages 
together, not limiting Medicare-eligibles, Boyle (2005) finds that while the length of the 
average hospital stay declines, the number of hospital admissions is unchanged.  Thus, 
the decrease in hospital admissions for Medicare-eligibles, the segment of the population 
most affected by the acquisition of drug coverage, provides suggestive evidence that the 
drug benefit is associated with a decline in the overall need for inpatient services. 
Even more striking, the results indicate a decline in total spending (by all payers) 
on both inpatient and outpatient services.  The reported coefficients indicate a 7 percent 
decline in spending on outpatient services and a 14 percent decline in inpatient spending, 
relative to the pre-period veteran average.  These results are consistent with the finding 
by Shang and Goldman (2007) of a 13 percent decrease in Medicare Part A spending and 
a 4 percent decrease in Medicare Part B spending as a result of the presence of a Medigap 
prescription benefit.  The drop in spending for both inpatient and outpatient services, 
coupled with the significant increase in prescription spending provide strong evidence 
that prescription drugs are a substitute for certain other medical services. 
  Table 3 also reports the effect of the policy change on two different health 
outcome measures.  The first of these is a health indicator, coded as 1 if a veteran reports 
excellent, very good or good health, and 0 if health is described as fair or poor.  The 
second tested measure is a dummy for whether the individual’s social activities are 
  13limited by health.
12  According to both of these measures, health appears to improve as a 
result of the VA policy change.  As a result of the new VA health benefits, elderly 
veterans are 1.5 percent more likely to report their health as good, very good or excellent, 
and 5 percent less likely to report that their health limits their social activities.  These 
results are again in contrast to findings for the entire veteran population, for whom the 
policy change has a negative effect on self-reported health and activity limitation status 
(Boyle, 2005).
13  Since younger veterans are less likely than older veterans to gain drug 
coverage as a result of the policy change (because more of them have access to employer-
provided coverage), it is reasonable to conclude that the drug benefit is at least partly 
responsible for the differential positive impact on health for older veterans. 
  The lack of an effect of the VA prescription drug benefit on the quantity of drugs 
consumed calls into question whether the increase in spending for veterans in the post-
policy period is in fact a result of the VA benefit, or is a result of some other 
unobservable phenomenon.  In order to better understand the effects of the benefit on 
drug spending by the veteran population, I next consider the effect of the policy change 
on the composition of payment for prescription drugs.  For each medical service provided 
during the year, the MCBS contains information on payment, broken down by individual 
payers.  This allows me to consider whether the policy change has an impact on the 
amount spent by each individual payment source.   
                                                 
12 Activities of Daily Living (ADL) measures such as this one have been shown to be excellent predictors 
of morbidity and mortality.  Wiener et al. (1990) provides a list of papers which give evidence of the 
predictive power of ADLs in determining health. 
13 Although not reported in that paper, the same regressions in Boyle (2005) were run for the Medicare-
eligible sample in the National Health Interview Survey.  For those individuals, self-reported health 
improved by a magnitude similar to that found with the MCBS data.  Thus, results across the two samples 
are quite consistent for the elderly population. 
  14  The results for prescription spending by various payers are reported in Table 4.  
These results confirm a distinct shift in the source of payment once the benefit is in place.  
As a result of the policy change, drug spending by VA increases by $88 for the average 
veteran in the post-period, a 318 percent increase relative to the pre-period average.   
Simultaneously, spending by veterans out of pocket and spending through insurance 
plans purchased in the private individual market decline 20 percent and 79 percent 
respectively.  Thus, while there is not an effect on the average number of prescriptions 
filled, there is a marked change in who pays for these prescriptions.  This shift from 
private to public payment may also be health- and welfare-enhancing, if dollars 
previously allocated to prescription spending may now be used to purchase other 
necessities. 
  Of additional note is the fact that spending by private, employer-provided 
insurance plans and HMOs increases as a result of the policy change.  There is a strong 
incentive for retirees with these types of benefits to also switch to using the VA drug 
benefit, because VA requires very little (if any) cost sharing by the veteran.
14  Thus, even 
if a veteran has outside insurance, he can still save a substantial amount of money by 
filling prescriptions through a VA doctor.  If these prescriptions are not related to a 
service-connected condition, however, VA can bill the veteran’s insurance company for 
its share of the cost.  It is therefore possible that privately insured veterans can afford to 
switch to costlier drugs as a result of the policy change, and that the cost of the switch is 
partly borne by the private insurance company. 
 
                                                 
14 As mentioned earlier, during the time period considered in this study, newly-eligible veterans paid a co-
payment of $2 per prescription, while previously-eligible veterans paid nothing for prescription drugs. 
  15V. Robustness Checks 
In interpreting the results above, I have assumed that the differential changes in 
veteran healthcare utilization and health outcomes are directly attributable to the policy 
change in question.  One concern with this causal interpretation is the possibility that the 
results are driven by a pre-existing trend that impacts the treated population (veterans) 
and the non-treated population (non-veterans) differentially, but is not related to the 
policy change in question.  In order to establish that no such trend exists, I have run the 
regressions reported in tables 2-4 on the pre-period sample alone, coding 1992 and 1993 
as “pre” years and 1994 and 1995 as “post” years.  Results from this exercise for the three 
spending outcomes are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 5.  As shown in the table, the 
coefficients on the “post x veteran” term are statistically insignificant, and have the 
opposite sign from those found in the main results, confirming that no such pre-trend 
exists.  The same regression was run for all other outcomes reported in tables 2-4 with 
similar results.  The coefficients on “post x veteran” are statistically insignificant and are 
typically either attenuated or have an opposite sign from the main result. 
  Another concern is that there may be systematic differences between veterans and 
non-veterans that change over time.  In order to account for this possibility, I run 
regressions for all outcomes reported in tables 2-4 allowing the control variables to enter 
for veterans and non-veterans separately.  This is achieved by interacting each control 
with the veteran indicator.  In these regressions, the coefficients on the veteran 
interactions are typically insignificant, and the coefficient of interest has similar 
magnitude and significance to the main results, as demonstrated in columns 4-6 of Table 
5. 
  16  Finally, as mentioned above, for 0-1 outcomes a probit model was tested in 
addition to the OLS model.  Probit marginal effects for these three outcomes are reported 
in columns 7-9 of Table 5.  These results are very similar to the OLS coefficients 
reported earlier. 
 
VI. Which Veterans Are Affected? 
  While it is important to consider the aggregate effects of prescription coverage on 
Medicare-eligible elderly veterans, these individuals fall into two distinct groups, each of 
which may be impacted differently.  As mentioned above, veterans may be classified as 
either newly-eligible for VA care (i.e. non-poor and non-disabled) or were eligible 
previously because of low-incomes or service-connected conditions.  Newly-eligible 
individuals are the only segment of the population that undergoes a true shift from no 
coverage to a full benefit.  Thus, isolating the effect on this group is of particular 
importance.   
At the same time, previously-eligible veterans have the potential to be just as 
strongly affected, for a number of different reasons.  First, these individuals became 
eligible for use of a health care system with a much wider scope of available services.  
Prescriptions, under the rules of the previous system, were available only for treatment of 
service-connected conditions, unless they were issued following a hospitalization.  In 
addition, the publicity surrounding the policy change may have raised awareness among 
veterans regarding the availability of VA care.  Low-income veterans with no service-
connected disabilities may have been previously unaware of their eligibility to receive 
care through the VA system, but may have learned of this option as a result of the policy 
  17change.  Low-income individuals additionally are more likely to be in poor health (see, 
for example Kiulia and Mieszkowski, 2007) and are less likely to be able to afford 
prescription expenses out of pocket.  Thus, the magnitude of the impact on this 
population is potentially large.   
In order to examine the impact of the drug benefit on these two populations 
separately, I split my veteran sample into newly-eligibles and previously-eligibles, and 
test for a differential impact on the two groups.  To accomplish this, I must first choose 
comparable non-veteran controls for the newly- and previously-eligible subsets of the 
veteran population.  I achieve this by drawing samples matched on propensity score.  The 
details of this matching procedure are described in the appendix. 
Summary statistics for the matched samples are reported in Table 6.  The 
characteristics of veterans and non-veterans in these groups are much more similar than 
in the unmatched sample.  Additionally, there are, as expected, distinct differences 
between the newly- and previously-eligible populations.  Previously-eligibles are less 
educated, less likely to be married, more likely to be black or Hispanic, and on average 
report poorer health than newly-eligibles. 
  Selected results by eligibility status are reported in Table 7.
15  Panel A reports the 
impact of the drug benefit on prescription drug utilization for the two groups.  For the 
previously-eligible population, the results are consistent with those for the entire 
Medicare veteran population.  Total spending on drugs increases significantly, with the 
drug benefit resulting in an increase in total spending of $61 on average, an 11 percent 
increase.  There is not any significant effect on the number of prescriptions filled but the 
                                                 
15 The full set of results is available upon request.  Outcomes that are similar to those for the aggregate 
sample and do not vary significantly (as reported in the “sig diff?” row) across the newly- and previously-
eligible samples are not reported. 
  18probability of having any prescription spending increases by about 4 percent.  The results 
for newly-eligibles are markedly different, however, in that there is no significant effect 
on total prescription spending.  The coefficient of interest for the spend any outcome is 
positive, and not significantly different from the outcome for previously-eligibles, but it 
is imprecisely measured.  These results imply that wealthier, newly-eligible veterans do 
not experience much change in the type or quantity of prescription drugs consumed after 
gaining eligibility for public prescription coverage.  This is not surprising, given that 
individuals in this group are much more likely than their previously-eligible counterparts 
to have other sources of drug coverage (e.g. retiree health benefits) or to be able to afford 
to finance their prescription spending either out-of-pocket, or through purchase of a 
supplemental insurance plan.  They are also less likely to have chronic conditions 
accompanied by high prescription costs.  This lack of an effect does not imply, however, 
that newly-eligibles gain no benefit from public prescription coverage, since private 
money previously spent on prescriptions may now be used for other health- and welfare-
enhancing purchases. 
With this in mind, I examine the effects of the policy change on health care 
utilization and health outcomes of the newly- and previously-eligible populations.  Both 
groups experience a significant improvement in health according to both tested measures.  
These results are not reported, however, because there is no significant difference for 
newly- versus previously-eligibles, and the magnitude of the coefficients is very similar 
to that for the aggregate population.  In panel B, I report the effects of the policy change 
on health care utilization for newly- and previously-eligibles.  Number of hospital stays 
declines for previously-eligibles but does not change significantly for newly-eligibles.  
  19This result is unsurprising on two counts.  First, only the previously eligible population 
was subject to the shift from inpatient-focused to outpatient-focused care that 
accompanied the VA policy change.  Second, as detailed above, only previously-eligibles 
appear to experience a marked increase in prescription spending.  To the extent that drug 
availability is responsible for a drop in utilization of other services, this substitution 
should occur for the previously-eligibles but not newly-eligibles.  Inpatient and outpatient 
spending falls for both groups, though the newly-eligible coefficients are not precisely 
measured.  The drop in inpatient spending is significantly larger for previously-eligibles 
than for newly-eligibles.
 16
  Results by payer type are reported in panel C.  Both newly- and previously-
eligible veterans experience higher drug payments by VA as a result of the policy change.  
The magnitude of the increase is large for the previously-eligibles, and quite a bit smaller 
for newly-eligibles.  For the previously-eligible population, the policy change results in a 
$162 increase in average drug spending per person by VA, while the increase is $44 for 
newly-eligible veterans.  As in the results for the entire sample, out-of-pocket spending 
on drugs falls quite a bit for both newly- and previously-eligibles, and spending through 
insurance plans purchased on the individual market also falls, although these coefficients 
are not significantly different across the two groups and thus are not reported.   
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
  In general, the results of this study indicate that receipt of a publicly-provided 
prescription benefit will lead to an increase in spending on prescriptions, and 
                                                 
16 Coefficients for number of doctor visits are small and insignificant and did not statistically differ across 
the two samples.   
  20simultaneously, a decrease in spending on other medical services.  In this instance, for the 
average veteran, drug spending increases by $97 while spending on inpatient and 
outpatient services decrease by $202 and $424, respectively.  Although some of the drop 
in spending may be attributable to other changes in the VA health care system, it is likely 
that for Medicare-eligibles, who were already recipients of an alternative form of public 
insurance in the pre-period, a substantial portion of the spending changes arise 
specifically because of the receipt of the prescription coverage that was absent from their 
Medicare benefits but is included in the VA benefit. 
Roughly speaking, the results therefore imply that every additional dollar of drug 
spending leads to a $6.50 decrease in spending on other medical services.  Although this 
analysis cannot account for general equilibrium effects (e.g. the fact that improved health 
may lead to increased life expectancy and therefore higher lifetime medical spending) 
there is strong evidence that at least in a static sense, the drug benefit will be cost-saving 
for the average recipient.  In addition, the benefit appears to accrue mainly to low-income 
and disabled individuals.  This population typically has higher-than-average medical 
expenses, and is also more likely to experience substantial welfare increases from the 
relative income increase associated with the reduction (to zero) of the price of 
prescription drugs. 
In a 2002 report on the issues surrounding the design of a Medicare prescription 
drug benefit, the Congressional Budget Office stated that “the fundamental issue inherent 
in the debate about adding a drug benefit to Medicare may not be one of providing for 
use of prescription drugs so much as one of redistributing the cost of drugs away from the 
people, companies and government entities that now pay for them” (CBO 2002).  The 
  21results of this study appear to support that hypothesis.  While utilization of prescriptions 
by Medicare-eligible veterans appears quite inelastic, on average, there is a distinct shift 
in the composition of who pays for the drugs.  Out-of-pocket spending on prescriptions 
drops sharply when the benefit becomes available and spending by VA increases a great 
deal, especially for veterans in the previously-eligible group, who tend to have lower 
incomes and poorer health. 
This shift in payers appears to be welfare-enhancing along multiple dimensions.  
It is accompanied by an increase in spending on drugs, and also improvements in health, 
suggesting that the drugs received may be more effective.  Meanwhile, a much larger 
decrease in spending on other health services is observed.  Finally, if beneficiaries spend 
the money that they would otherwise have spent on drugs on other health-improving 
consumption goods (better food, for example), the policy change may improve average 
health even if it does not substantially change drug consumption.   
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  25Appendix:  Sampling Previously- and Newly-Eligibles 
  For each veteran in the sample, the MCBS contains sufficient detail to determine 
eligibility status.  Using information about the veteran’s income (a variable which also 
accounts for the income of the veteran’s spouse, if applicable) I can verify whether or not 
the veteran is below the VA-established means test cutoff in a given year.  Additionally, 
the data contain information about the veteran’s service-connected disability rating.   
Following military service, every veteran who is injured or disabled in the line of duty is 
assigned a rating for the severity of that disability.  Any veteran with a rating higher than 
0 percent was eligible for VA care prior to the policy change.  I can therefore establish 
whether a veteran was previously-eligible as the result of a service-connected condition. 
  In order to choose comparable controls from my sample of non-veterans, I 
divide my treated (i.e. post-period) veteran sample into two groups – those with and those 
without service-connected conditions.  I then use propensity score matching to draw 
groups of individuals with comparable characteristics from the pre- and post-period non-
veteran samples, as well as from the pre-period veteran sample.  I calculate the propensity 
score (probability of treatment) using a logit model and controlling for a set of 
characteristics that includes year of birth, income, education, state of residence, residence 
in an MSA, race and marital status.  Additionally, I include a number of activities of daily 
living (ADL) measures.  These measures are indicator variables coded to 1 if the 
individual reports having a lot of difficulty with or being unable to perform the following 
actions:  kneeling, lifting, reaching, walking and writing. 
Once the propensity score is calculated, I match each treated veteran to the 
individual in each of the other three groups (pre- and post-period non-veterans, and pre-
period veterans) with the closest propensity score.  This matching is done without 
  26replacement, and I impose a common support, meaning that treated individuals with 
propensity scores either above or below the scores for all non-treated individuals are 
dropped.
17  This leaves me with comparable control groups for both the disabled and 
non-disabled veterans in my sample.  I then code each individual as being “newly-
eligible” or “previously-eligible” based on income and disability group (where non-
veterans matched to disabled veterans are considered “disabled” and therefore 
“previously-eligible.”)   
The benefit of performing such a match is that it allows me to select a group of 
observably similar individuals to serve as controls for veterans with and without service-
connected disabilities.  The major drawback, however, is that unmatched individuals 
must be dropped from the sample.  In general, this can result in large reductions in 
sample size (Blundell & Costa Dias, 2000).  In this case, I retain about half of my original 
sample.
                                                 
17 The matching is accomplished with a Stata module, psmatch2, written by Leuven and Sianesi (see 
references). 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics MCBS 1992-2001 









Age  72.978  75.060 79.236 77.607 
  (6.179)  (6.120) (7.855) (8.451) 
Hispanic  .005  .008 .018 .045 
Black  .067  .064 .105 .111 
Married  .762  .747 .680 .649 
HS  Diploma  .291  .272 .210 .214 
Some  College  .142  .231 .086 .130 
College  Degree  .208  .234 .114 .144 
Metro  .721  .687 .672 .640 
Income 33451.57  36698.13  24020.51  26471.15 
  (43837.44)  (48215.68) (42157.90) (50774.48) 
Health (=0 if poor or fair, 1 
if good, very good or 
excellent) 
.768  .769 .684 .686 
Activity  Limitation?  .286  .284 .401 .377 
Any  Drug  Spending  .807  .863 .779 .808 
Total Drug Spending  547.12  1037.06  524.23  880.26 
 (764.12)  (1281.49)  (738.82)  (1358.22) 
Number Prescriptions  14.401  20.15  15.075  20.280 
 (18.308)  (21.59)  (19.258)  (22.867) 
Drug Spend OOP  287.53  370.67  308.44  414.66 
 (457.93)  (534.02)  (498.58)  (639.43) 
Drug Spend Private HMO  18.46  45.57  14.84  26.80 
 (157.00)  (291.51)  (153.24)  (203.43) 
Drug Spend Empl Provided  141.24  379.31  96.15  227.16 
 (422.50)  (851.42)  (347.45)  (969.09) 
Drug Spend Individual Mkt  17.40  32.19  15.19  38.88 
 (129.16)  (189.61)  (121.86)  (210.91) 
Drug Spend VA  27.70  111.84  n/a  n/a 
 (204.78)  (469.26)     
Outpatient  Spending  2930.27  3669.85 3005.31 3600.62 
 (6634.55)  (6083.01)  (4858.21)  (6042.94) 
Inpatient  Spending  2967.02  3206.82 3484.35 3830.58 
 (10271.61)  (9956.76)  (13163.34)  (11327.44) 
Hospital  Stays  .295  .336 .405 .450 
 (.766)  (.824)  (.926)  (1.027) 
Doctor Visits  4.450  5.528  5.135  5.525 
  (5.432)  (6.188) (5.775) (6.202) 
Sample restricted to males age 65+.  All dollar amounts are in 2000$.  Standard deviations in parentheses where applicable. 
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Table 2.  Prescription Drug Utilization       
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Total Spending  Log (#Prescriptions)  Spend Any (0-1) 
post x veteran  97.4582**  0.0191  0.0162+ 
 (17.5248)  (0.0256)  (0.0092) 
veteran -236.3554  -0.3002  0.0212 
 (137.4091)  (0.2867)  (0.1336) 
urban 41.7397  -0.0236  0.0115 
 (28.3260)  (0.0303)  (0.0071) 
hispanic 75.6159+  0.0278  0.0651* 
 (43.0235)  (0.0516)  (0.0226) 
black -92.4067**  0.0231  -0.0116+ 
 (26.4644)  (0.0334)  (0.0065) 
marital status  87.0584**  0.0428+  0.0415** 
 (17.7828)  (0.0206)  (0.0057) 
observations       28883       23871       28883 
Results from estimating equation (1) by OLS. Dependent variables include a measure of total annual  
spending on prescription drugs (total from all payer sources), log number of prescriptions filled during  
the year, and an indicator for any drug spending during the year. Robust standard errors in parentheses  
are clustered on veteran and year. Spending is measured in 2000$. Controls also include age, age*veteran,  
state, year, income group and education dummies and a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses  
are clustered on veteran and year. 
 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   30
Table 3.  Utilization and Health           
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Health (0-1)       Activity 
Limitation (0-1) 
post x veteran  -0.0451*  0.0846  -201.8444*  -423.7555*  0.0122*  -0.0131+ 
 (0.0172)  (0.1033)  (77.5558)  (186.9180)  (0.0051)  (0.0070) 
veteran 0.1102  -1.5825  -30.4967  1,205.4890  -0.0054  0.0044 
 (0.2457)  (1.1447)  (800.1400)  (3,153.7430) (0.0045)  (0.0058) 
urban 0.0166  0.5634**  288.0152**  564.5913**  -0.0010  0.0099 
 (0.0178)  (0.1280)  (73.5115)  (161.3298)  (0.0065)  (0.0083) 
hispanic -0.0814+  0.8904*  96.2379  786.2235  -0.0008  -0.0349 
 (0.0385)  (0.3310)  (174.5389)  (1,630.0492) (0.0243)  (0.0227) 
black -0.0485*  -1.0736**  -68.7646  168.7677  -0.0378**  0.0220 
 (0.0171)  (0.0884)  (165.3538)  (227.1263)  (0.0091)  (0.0127) 
marital status  -0.0214  0.2894*  17.6230  -144.8095  -0.0184*  0.0071 
 (0.0133)  (0.1064)  (76.4422)  (113.4840)  (0.0079)  (0.0076) 
observations       28883       28883       28883       28883       28794       28667 
Results from estimating equation (1) by OLS. Hospital Stays is the number of unique hospitalizations in the past year and Office Visits is the number  
of unique outpatient visits in the past year.  Outpatient Spending is the sum of spending for all clinic visits and outpatient hospital admissions by all  
payment sources, and Inpatient Spending is the sum of spending for all inpatient hospital admissions by all payment sources. Health is an indicator =1 
 if individual is in excellent, very good or good health, and 0 otherwise. Activity Limitation is an indicator =1 if individual reports that health limits  
social activity. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. 
Controls also include age, age*veteran, state, year, income group and education dummies and a constant. 
 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   31
Table  4.    Composition  of  Spending          
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 




Out of Pocket 
post x veteran  22.3821**  88.4966**  81.2422**  -13.7806**  -57.0276** 
  (3.2076)  (15.8545)  (8.7532) (3.2029) (6.7794) 
veteran -20.5171+  -2.8186  -8.4362  -25.8026  -173.3387** 
  (11.6662)  (31.2541)  (64.7334) (18.2641) (45.7939) 
urban 16.1737**  1.9586  31.7017+  -3.4297  -16.5916* 
  (4.7105)  (2.8694)  (16.2568) (2.4494) (7.6370) 
hispanic  2.5097  2.1002  -72.6389** -12.3095** -25.6172 
 (8.7898)  (8.8863)  (8.5042)  (2.3609)  (32.0614) 
black 2.1111  11.5306+  -27.0723*  -8.6502**  -73.7808** 
 (5.7111)  (6.4787)  (12.4475)  (1.7492)  (12.4139) 
marital status  0.8148  12.0980  27.6174**  0.5465  28.0161** 
  (2.3848)  (9.3438)  (6.8764) (2.1170) (8.4802) 
observations       28883       28883       28883       28883       28883 
Results from estimating equation (1) by OLS. Dependent variables are annual amount of spending by payer type. Robust  
standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. Spending is measured in 2000$. Controls also include age,  
age*veteran, state, year, income group and education dummies and a constant. 
 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     32
 
Table 5.  Robustness Checks 
 
 
  “Pre”=1992 & 1993, “Post” = 1994 & 1995  Fully Interacted  Probit Marginal Effects 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 














Health (0-1)  Activity 
Limitation (0-1) 
post x veteran  -1.6386  104.4266  296.7965  106.5164**  -169.8245*  -372.0021+  0.0213*  0.0111*  -0.0143* 
 (12.3752)  (100.4597)  (224.6388)  (17.4141)  (69.3050)  (201.0340)  (0.0095)  (0.0050)  (0.0069) 
veteran  -8.9208  193.5784 7,073.1804  205.3500 1,985.4111  2,030.3071  0.0131  -0.0046  0.0044 
  (8.9947)  (610.6095) (4,071.4308)  (196.3203) (1,361.9156) (3,903.5949)  (0.1102)  (0.0046)  (0.0059) 
metro -6.7144  285.6448*  407.9059  -23.7618  252.5714+  615.9011*  0.0115+  -0.0020  0.0116 
  (21.6688)  (114.4341) (230.7870)  (17.8310) (137.6013) (243.1702)  (0.0068)  (0.0068)  (0.0089) 
hispanic 162.7018*  752.2012*  3,903.2108  122.3804*  226.2911  1,401.2054  0.0557** 0.0001  -0.0324 
 (56.3898)  (316.5323)  (4,519.7756)  (46.9814)  (226.6630) (2,168.0670)  (0.0181)  (0.0209)  (0.0212) 
black  -38.5373  -134.2035 180.0146  -127.2429*  -292.2588 215.6667  -0.0126*  -0.0334**  0.0205 
  (20.6206)  (229.3243) (371.1073)  (46.5298) (272.4998) (305.2435)  (0.0062)  (0.0086)  (0.0126) 
marital  status  33.3768+  -84.4254 -196.7419  99.6388**  -39.5780 -254.7070+  0.0411**  -0.0171*  0.0062 
  (16.6284)  (123.7693) (147.2712)  (26.2832) (102.5486) (133.5239)  (0.0062)  (0.0074)  (0.0077) 
observations       14717       14717       14717       28883       28883       28883       28876       28786       28659 
Results from estimating equation (1). Estimation is by OLS in columns 1-6 and Probit in columns 7-9. Marginal effects are reported for Probit results. Controls also include age, 
age*veteran, state, year, income group and education dummies and a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. Spending is measured in 
2000$. Columns 1-3 report results from restricting the regression universe to years 1992-1995, with ’94 and ’95 coded as “post”. Columns 4-6 report results when a full set of 
veteran interaction terms is added to the controls. Columns 7-9 report results for 0-1 outcomes when estimated with a probit model rather than OLS. 
 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 6A.  Summary Statistics, Matched Sample of Newly Eligibles 









Age  75.039  75.241 74.062 75.513 
  (6.659)  (7.980) (6.223) (7.271) 
Hispanic  .006  .008 .010 .007 
Black  .049  .036 .042 .032 
Married  .848  .842 .864 .823 
HS  Diploma  .298  .278 .326 .290 
Some  College  .162  .143 .175 .210 
College  Degree  .216  .273 .270 .286 
Metro  .666  .691 .716 .667 
Income 43493.94  49418.90  48522.64  51572.01 
  (42967.11)  (61275.21) (62667.54) (82017.58) 
Health (=0 if poor or fair, 1 
if good, very good or 
excellent) 
.750  .797 .794 .814 
Activity  Limitation?  .323  .280 .270 .268 
Any  Drug  Spending  .839  .863 .855 .866 
Total  Drug  Spending  634.20  1035.21 622.73 1074.49 
 (783.74)  (1229.99)  (791.07)  (1810.27) 
Number  Prescriptions  15.888  19.925 15.410 20.444 
 (17.959)  (20.950)  (19.427)  (21.986) 
Drug Spend OOP  336.20  397.52  363.87  500.05 
 (511.28)  (576.15)  (522.18)  (696.49) 
Drug Spend Private HMO  25.78  64.85  28.57  43.20 
 (199.27)  (348.82)  (179.50)  (217.22) 
Drug Spend Empl Provided  189.60  408.20  167.17  414.57 
 (446.50)  (874.06)  (437.23)  (1506.75) 
Drug Spend Individual Mkt  21.35  40.97  29.30  60.71 
 (154.34)  (213.92)  (200.76)  (289.37) 
Drug Spend VA  12.76  57.49  n/a  n/a 
 (98.85)  (272.79)     
Outpatient  Spending  3490.42  3645.03 3175.63 3770.75 
 (6428.34)  (5563.99)  (5364.89)  (6698.59) 
Inpatient  Spending  3147.63  3363.99 3127.12 3443.73 
  (9829.78)  (10429.83) (10301.24) (11000.57) 
Hospital  Stays  .334  .339 .351 .364 
 (.799)  (.826)  (.897)  (.914) 
Doctor Visits  5.405  5.802  5.502  6.014 
  (5.774)  (6.507) (5.880) (6.386) 
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Table 6B.  Summary Statistics, Matched Sample of Previously Eligibles 









Age  74.789  76.032 72.631 76.098 
  (6.786)  (6.918) (5.916) (6.983) 
Hispanic  .015  .020 .018 .023 
Black  .129  .113 .106 .110 
Married  .601  .620 .643 .638 
HS  Diploma  .240  .255 .240 .242 
Some  College  .102  .150 .119 .153 
College  Degree  .090  .115 .108 .119 
Metro  .634  .631 .664 .653 
Income 17462.23  19728.67  20994.38  19605.82 
  (15128.65)  (30576.79) (41213.11) (21258.01) 
Health (=0 if poor or fair, 1 
if good, very good or 
excellent) 
.617  .657 .671 .673 
Activity  Limitation?  .442  .389 .371 .390 
Any  Drug  Spending  .774  .826 .784 .819 
Total  Drug  Spending  540.84  963.53 544.83 901.87 
 (781.45)  (1254.98)  (721.61)  (1207.94) 
Number  Prescriptions  16.794  20.838 15.565 21.426 
 (21.529)  (23.084)  (19.318)  (23.712) 
Drug Spend OOP  286.41  314.45  290.40  428.06 
 (450.35)  (496.41)  (444.99)  (601.40) 
Drug Spend Private HMO  10.06  33.25  14.62  27.62 
 (92.51)  (290.70)  (120.75)  (217.91) 
Drug Spend Empl Provided  105.56  248.64  116.03  222.98 
 (412.68)  (700.59)  (384.87)  (753.13) 
Drug Spend Individual Mkt  11.98  21.95  13.46  37.05 
 (90.77)  (155.83)  (384.87)  (192.76) 
Drug Spend VA  44.57  212.78  n/a  n/a 
 (234.96)  (624.12)     
Outpatient  Spending  3355.03  3597.60 3116.02 3605.75 
 (6808.98)  (6201.08)  (5673.46)  (6388.11) 
Inpatient  Spending  4296.25  3644.30 3456.93 3891.26 
  (13611.53)  (10257.64) (11240.89) (11032.70) 
Hospital  Stays  .398  .398 .358 .456 
 (.884)  (.911)  (.857)  (1.043) 
Doctor Visits  4.257  4.703  4.996  5.756 
  (5.648)  (6.066) (5.751) (6.476) 
        
Sample restricted to males age 65+.  All dollar amounts are in 2000$.  Standard deviations in parentheses where applicable. 
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Table 7.  Results By Eligibility Status 
 
                             A.  Prescription Drug Utilization 
  Newly Eligible  Previously Eligible 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total  Spending  Log 
(#Prescriptions) 
Spend Any (0-1)  Total Spending  Log 
(#Prescriptions) 
Spend Any (0-1) 
post x veteran  -17.3762  -0.0234  0.0117  60.8701+  -0.0412  0.0281* 
  (24.7993) (0.0337) (0.0090)  (32.0560) (0.0487) (0.0130) 
veteran 17.5167  0.0610*  -0.0041  -304.9164  -0.6012+  -0.1926 
  (23.2637) (0.0279) (0.0042)  (275.7636) (0.3295) (0.2652) 
sig diff?        Yes       No        No       
observations        5316       4578        5316       9824       7969       9824 
 
                                     B.  Health Care Utilization 
  Newly Eligible  Previously Eligible 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Hospital Stays  Inpatient Spending  Outpatient  
Spending 
Hospital Stays  Inpatient Spending  Outpatient 
Spending 
post x veteran  -0.0159  -320.0943  -392.2700  -0.0846*  -1,206.3949*  -356.3767* 
 (0.0400)  (337.0718)  (254.7127)  (0.0321)  (421.6436)  (139.1801) 
veteran -0.0209  6.3653  299.9851  0.0163  852.5496*  284.5285* 
 (0.0306)  (277.9271)  (236.4172)  (0.0254)  (337.0732)  (129.3990) 
sig diff?       Yes        Yes  No       
observations       5316        5316  5316       9824       9824  9824 
 
                                      C.  Composition of Payment 
  Newly Eligible  Previously Eligible 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
 Private  Insurance 
(Employer Provided) 
Out of Pocket  VA  Private Insurance 
(Employer Provided) 
Out of Pocket  VA 
post x veteran  -16.5373  -48.4405*  44.3382**  25.7489**  -108.8805**  162.2713** 
  (15.4172)  (22.7250) (13.6340)  (7.3583)  (7.5099) (26.4247) 
veteran 31.0296**  -32.9639*  9.4248*  8.4890  -0.3261  53.3215** 
  (9.9905)  (15.3875) (4.1446)  (6.8931)  (6.3524) (5.9968) 
sig diff?        Yes       Yes       Yes       
observations        5316       5316       5316       9824       9824       9824 
 
Results from estimating equation (1) by OLS. Dependent variables in panel A. include a measure of total annual spending on prescription drugs (total from all payer sources), log 
number of prescriptions filled during the year, and an indicator for any drug spending during the year. In panel B., Hospital Stays is the number of unique hospitalizations in the 
past year, Outpatient Spending is the sum of spending for all clinic visits and outpatient hospital admissions, and Inpatient Spending is the sum of spending for all inpatient hospital 
admissions. Dependent variables in panel C. are annual amount of spending by payer type. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. Spending is 
measured in 2000$. Controls also include age, age*veteran, state, year, income group and education dummies and a constant.  “Sig diff?” indicates whether the coefficient of 
interest is statistically significantly different across the two populations at the 5% level. 